President Barack Obama’s subtle but clear message to India during his primetime news conference on Wednesday was to tell New Delhi not to make Pakistan feel threatened as it goes about the task of taking on the Taliban-Al Qaeda combined in its northwest territory.
Answering a question about whether the United States can secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and prevent it from falling into the hands of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Obama also made a reference to India.
“On the military side you are starting to see the recognition in the last few days that the obsession with India as the mortal threat to Pakistan has been misguided, that there biggest threat right now comes internally. You are starting to see the Pakistani military see the armed threat from the militant extremists more seriously. We want to continue to encourage Pakistan to move in that direction,” Obama said.
In saying that India is not the mortal threat to Pakistan, Obama was equally telling India not to wield that threat at a time when the U.S. is encouraging to neutralize the Islamist threat not just to the region but to Washington’s strategic interests there. In a question about Pakistan and the Taliban and Al Qaeda this is as close as a judicious president can get to telling India to be mindful of its neighbor’s anxieties.
While the eventual ability of the Taliban to overrun the Pakistani state may have been seriously overstated as it walked into Buner district, which is just about 60 miles from Islamabad, that was the closest came to being the nightmare scenario that Washington has feared for a while. I personally thought that at some point the Pakistan army’s self-preservation instinct would come alive and prompt it to let the Taliban known who the boss is. Unless Pakistan’s army has been so fundamentally influenced by the ideology championed by the Taliban, there is no way that it would let the Taliban establish its primacy in the country.
I am very interested to find out what it is that inhibited the Pakistani army for as long as it did while the Taliban practically showed up at the capital’s doorstep. There are only two possible explanations—either it was making a point to all concerned about what lay in store for the country without the army putting its foot down or its internal erosion by those who share the Taliban ideology within the rank and file is more serious than what the world has realized. The second scenario is truly nightmarish.
My reading of the situation based on a deeply cultural understanding of the region is that self-preservation and the need to perpetuate its own hold on the Pakistani society will trump everything, including any ideological considerations, and propel the Pakistani army to take on the Taliban to the extent that the latter does not begin to have illusions about its own reach.